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Why Some Sectors of Transition Economies are less Reformed than 
Others? The Case of Research and Education 
 
Pavel Ciaian and Jan Pokrivcak 
 
Introduction 
After the fall of the Communist regimes, the former centrally planned economies of 
the Soviet Bloc faced the choice on how to reform their economies. Most countries 
have chosen to introduce market mechanisms in most sectors of the economy. The 
main reform components introduced to support markets were privatization, 
restructuring of the state companies, market liberalization, and creation of institutional 
environment for property rights protection (Roland, 2000). There were differences 
between countries regarding the speed of reform (shock therapy versus gradualism) or 
regarding the sequencing of the reforms (Roland, 2001; Sachs, 1992).  
After more than ten years of transition it was observed that most economies of 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were significantly reformed, market 
economy institutions were created and price and trade liberalization took place. 
However, some sectors of the economy did not undergo significant market reforms. In 
particular this is the case of university system where reforms are lagging behind those 
undertaken in the industry.
1  
One possible explanation might be that university system differs from industry 
in the nature of product that it produces. University system is engaged in production 
of public goods rather than private goods. The sector also suffers from measurement 
                                                 
1 Health care system faces similar problems.   4
problem. Measurement of the quality of research and education is more difficult than 
the measurement of the quality of output produced by for example industry. Has the 
nature of the product that university system produces affected the speed of reforms? Is 
it reflected in the lower growth rates of productivity of this sector than productivity 
growth in other sectors? These are important questions that need to be addressed. 
First, these questions are important from the theoretical perspective. Second, there are 
significant policy implications of these questions because understanding how 
characteristics of the sector influence productivity and reform path is important for 
policy makers.  
In particular, this article has three objectives: a) to show that development of 
productivity in transition economies differs between sectors, the difference is due to 
the nature of product these sectors produce, i.e. private good or public good b) to 
show that the difference in productivities is due to difference in the degree of reforms 
of particular sectors, c) to explain why sectors producing public good are less 
reformed than industry or agriculture. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the output 
development during transition. We then introduce theoretical framework used in our 
analysis which is followed by an analysis of research systems during Communism. 
The fifth section explains reform path of the university system and how it is affected 
by market imperfections. The sixth and the seventh sections provide evidence on 
research productivity from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The final section 
concludes. 
   5
Output Growth during Transition 
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in CEECs 
and former republics of the Soviet Union (FSU) during transition. The output 
development takes the shape of “U”, i.e. decline in the first years of transition 
followed by subsequent increase. This shape of GDP growth was typical for all 
transition countries. After the third year of transition, the output in CEECs was down 
between 13% and 40% relative to 1989 pre-reform output. In the FSU the output 
decline was stronger and took longer. It reached the bottom, after the fourth year of 
transition. In 1995 relative to 1991 the output was down between around 18% and 
64%.  
There are several explanations for this initial output decline. The main factors 
were the disruption of old relations that were specific to planed economies (Blanchard 
and Kremer, 1997), Schumpeterian “creative destruction” and adjustment costs 
(Aghion and Blanchard, 1994), institutions (Roland, 2001; Rodrik, 2001), and initial 
conditions (Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey, 2002; de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev, 
2001). 
  Output started to grow after these initial adjustments (figure 1 and 2). The shift 
from state control to markets, led to rise in productivity. Markets created right 
incentives and liberalization led to tougher domestic and international competition. 
Companies were forced to increase efficiency. Market oriented reforms induced 
convergence of transition economies to developed economies. The convergence is 
faster in CEECs than in FSU. This is because reforms in CEECs succeeded to 
introduce better institutional environment in support of markets (Falcetti, Raiser, and 
Sanfey, 2002; de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev, 2001; Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, 
and Zettelmeyer, 1999).    6
  Not all sectors were reformed equally. Health care and university systems, for 
example, remained in most countries mostly unreformed
2.  The role of markets in 
health care and university system remained low relative to other sectors (OECD, 
2000; OECD, 2005a and 2005b, World Bank, 2003).  
  Figure 3 shows the research output in economics and related sciences in 
selected transition countries and in two developed countries (the Netherlands and 
Austria). The figure shows total annual number of papers published in peer-reviewed 
journals. The data were extracted from Web of Science database. 
  Total research production and productivity have remained stagnant in CEEC 
and FSU over the transition period. There is not observed a trend that would indicate 
an increase in productivity. This is more pronounced given the fact that research in 
social sciences including economics was politically restricted during Communism 
(see next section). One therefore would expect high increase in research output during 
transition from its low pre-transition level. For comparison the research output in the 
Netherlands and Austria have been continuously increasing (figure 3). Furthermore, 
figure 4 reveals that transition countries tend to publish in low quality journals
3, i.e. in 
journals with low impact factor. In CEEC and Russia around 75% and 45% of papers, 
respectively, were published in low quality journals, while in the Netherlands and 
Austria it was 9% and 12%, respectively. In summary it can be argued that there is no 
convergence in research productivity as it was the case in other sectors. 
 
                                                 
2 Agriculture is also lagging behind in reforms. This is due the accession of CEEC countries into the 
EU and adoption of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy which is strongly regulated by the governments 
(Swinnen, 1996). 
3 We use Impact Factor as calculated by Thomson Scientific to measure the quality of journals.   7
Theoretical Framework 
In markets where public goods are present the allocation of resources is inefficient. 
Private individuals under invest in provision of public goods. The main cause is 
inability of private sector to internalize all benefits (Hume, 1739; Hardin, 1968; 
Andreoni, 1988; Romer, 1990; Garadstein, 1992; Jones and Williams, 1998).  
Similarly, imperfect information may lead to inefficiencies due to adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Spence, 1973; Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1963).  
The presence of public goods and imperfect information is often used to 
justify state involvement. In such cases state interventions might increase social 
welfare. State allocation of resources can eliminate the gap between optimal social 
level of investment and private sector invests.  
University research and education is characterized by both the presence of 
public goods and asymmetric information. Because of the existence of public goods, 
private sector allocates fewer resources in research than it is socially optimal (Jones 
and Williams, 1998; Romer, 1990). The allocated resources by private sector not only 
may be small but also can be made too late (Gradstein, 1992). Gamer (1979) showed 
that because of imperfect information and measurement problem, job market for 
researchers may use improper screening criteria (the least costly ones) and therefore 
lead to Pareto inferior equilibrium. This affects not only research productivity but also 
the quality of research and the direction of science in which it develops. Wigger and 
Von Weizsacker (2001) showed that in the case of nonexistence of markets in which 
students can insure against educational risk (uncertain returns to education) and with 
risk-averse individuals, students will underinvest in education. 
  Because of these imperfections an extensive regulation of universities is 
observed. To overcome the problem of imperfect information state uses a regulatory   8
commission (office) that sets criteria for evaluation, collects information, and assists 
in policy implementation.   
  The existence of regulatory commission, however, affects relative costs and 
benefits for pressure groups. Pressure groups emerge because of the existence of 
public goods.  Olson (1965) considers the size of the group and costs of 
communication among their potential members as crucial factors determining whether 
an interest group (or broadly a collective action) is formed. By creating the 
commission the state decreases the communication cost of pressure groups making 
lobbing activity cheaper.   
Universities representatives are either members of the commission or 
commission cooperates with universities because universities have an information 
advantage. Contacts between the commission and universities becomes 
institutionalized which significantly reduces lobbing costs. 
Moreover, the existence of a regulatory commission through which funds and 
other benefits are delivered to universities is a signal for universities to increase 
activity in order to increase the level of support. This can be achieved because 
universities are better informed than the commission and are therefore able to 
influence it.
4  The original intention of policy makers to increase efficiency by 
eliminating market failure is used by pressure groups to increase protectionist and 
redistributive state intervention. 
The biggest beneficiaries are the existing universities which can use its 
privileged position to create barriers to entry into the university system by other 
subjects. The representatives of the existing universities therefore may lobby for the 
regulations that protect the existing universities, not all universities, i.e. existing and 
                                                 
4 In similar context Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) show that in equilibrium with asymmetric 
information and with heterogeneous bureaucrats who collect information and implement polices by 
which state intervenes to correct market failures, there will appear corruption.   9
potential entrants. Entry of new universities would reduce the benefits of the 
regulation accruing to the existing universities as benefits are shared among more 
subjects (Stigler, 1971).     
In other sectors of the economy which are not affected by the problem of 
public good and imperfect information like manufacturing there is no need to address 
market failure. Therefore regulatory commission is not created which makes costs of 
lobbing higher. Furthermore, nonexistence of regulatory commission sends a signal to 
market participants that no redistributory transfers are available. Because there is no 
government regulation that increases efficiency it is harder for pressure groups to 
obtain redistributory transfers.  
From the above analysis it follows that in the presence of market failures 
pressure groups are more effective. The equilibrium amount of lobbing is higher 
leading to higher protection of the existing universities. The question that arises next 
is how this affects university reform in transition countries and the growth of 
productivity of the sector. 
Garadstein (1993) showed that lobbing creates inefficiencies, but that state 
provision of public good frequently outperforms the private provision even in the 
presence of lobbing groups. Inefficiency generated by rent seeking incentives of 
lobbing groups in the case of public provision is smaller then inefficiency from free 
riding incentives in the case of private provision. However, in the presence of 
imperfect information and transaction costs this may not be the case. State 
intervention may be inefficient relative to market (Garadstein, 1992; Weisner, 1998). 
Additional inefficiencies may be caused by corruption which emerges where transfers 
are present (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000).  
     10
Background – Research System during Communism 
During Communism research was subject to strong political centralization. Basic 
research was concentrated in institutes of the Academy of Sciences while applied 
research was conducted by various institutes under the supervision of branch 
ministries (Ministry of the Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.). Research at 
universities played a marginal role. The main purpose of universities was teaching and 
supplying qualified labour to the economy (Balazs, Faulkner, and Schimank, 1995; 
Moore, 1994). 
Like other sectors research was also subject to central planning. Three or five-
year central plans set research priorities and allocated resources to institutes and 
universities and to each research activity within them. Some research fields were 
strongly supported (e.g. physics). Fields with smaller political weight, such as social 
sciences, were underfunded (Balazs, Faulkner, and Schimank, 1995; Moore, 1994).  
Each research institute (or state university) had to fulfill the centrally assigned 
plan. State monitoring was done through reporting. Research institutes (or 
departments within research institutes) produced reports where research output was 
presented. These reports had to be defended, normally in front of other research 
institutes. The fulfilment of the plan and hence the existence of the institute depended 
on the successful defence.  
This institutional setting led to the collusion among institutes. The institutes 
did not have an incentive to reject reports of other institutes because of mutual 
interdependence and measurement problem. If an institute used hard criteria of 
evaluation of reports presented by other research institutes, then in the future other 
institutes would behave similarly. Institutes playing hard strategy could find their own   11
research reports rejected in the future.
5 Imperfect information and the stress on the 
political aspects of the research made hard playing institutes vulnerable to retaliation. 
Playing hard would therefore threaten the fulfilment of the research plan and 
eventually lead to the reduction of funds from the government and in the most 
extreme case even to the closing of the institute (Kamenicek, 2005).  
Similar collusion existed with citations, which was used to measure the quality 
of research output. Mutual citations among institutes became widespread. Institutes 
for strategic reasons cited research output of other institutes irrespective of the quality 
of the cited research. In this way, institutes’ citations were artificially increased, 
which was necessary in fulfilling the centrally assigned plan (Kamenicek, 2005). 
This soft evaluation of research output became a norm in Communist 
countries. Probably this norm was stronger in social sciences where the measurement 
of quality is more difficult. In exact sciences (e.g. physics) this was less problematic 
because measurement of quality is easier especially if research findings are put in 
application.  
Significant additional distortions existed in terms of quality of research (and 
education). Research priorities were set centrally and were politically motivated. Only 
politically acceptable research topics or fields were supported. Social sciences were 
most negatively affected. The type of research conducted in Western countries was 
not allowed. The main role of research in social sciences was to support propaganda 
of the Communist regime, i.e. Marxism and Leninism.  
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis:  
                                                 
5 This is a classical example of prisoners’ dilemma game. The Nash equilibrium for one period game is 
to play hard strategy. This is the dominant strategy for all institutes. However, in an infinite game soft 
strategy is a Nash subgame-perfect equilibrium if discount rate is sufficiently close to one, meaning 
that future benefits have sufficiently high value to institutes. Institutes play so called trigger strategy. 
An institute cooperates (plays soft) until other institutes cooperate. Otherwise the institute stops 
cooperating. It plays hard strategy.    12
  Research skills were low in former communist countries because researchers 
operated under soft incentive environment.  
  Knowledge was distorted because only politically allowed research could be 
conducted. The worst affected were social sciences. For example in economics 
staff at universities or research institutes did not have knowledge of market 
economics.  
  Staff at universities did not have skills in research because their main activity 
was teaching.  
 
Market Failures and Reform Path during Transition 
With the fall of communism the central planning was abolished and market reforms 
were introduced. However, reforms lagged behind in sectors with public goods and 
large information asymmetries (e.g. health care, research, education), (OECD, 2000; 
OECD, 2005a and 2005b, World Bank, 2003).  
University system remained reliant on the administrative regulation. This 
however facilitated the creation of lobby groups that aimed at preserving the status 
quo. Lobby groups succeeded to gain significant control inside administrative 
structures regulating the sector and thus to influence the path of reform in the 
direction that fitted their interests the best.  
The role of history is crucial to understanding the reform path. The lobby 
group was formed from the representatives of former communist educational and 
research structures who had dominant positions in the sector after the fall of 
communism
6. These people were used to operate under soft evaluation criteria in the 
past, during socialism. More importantly they were educated in Marxist economics 
                                                 
6 Rigid tenure system helped the former communist professors to protect their positions after the 
changes of the social and economic system occurred.    13
which was strongly politically biased. Their past research was evaluated politically 
with little emphasis on scientific rigor. Because of these reasons the former 
communist economics elite preferred to maintain the status quo characterized by soft 
evaluation of research output. Their activity within the lobby group was directed 
towards achievement of this goal.  
During the communist regime universities were specialized in teaching. This 
was the second reason why the representatives of former communist education and 
research structures were not interested to introduce hard evaluation criteria for 
research. Hard criteria would cause large loses to the existing state universities in the 
long-run. Existing state universities did not have qualified staff to conduct high 
quality research, because of their past specialization in teaching. As a result, the 
interest of the representatives of former communist educational and research 
structures was to maintain teaching as their main activity, while research was of 
secondary importance.  
Finally, existing state universities would lose if free entry of new universities 
is allowed. Sharing the market with other competitors would lower average benefits. 
Through control of the commission the existing state universities succeeded to 
increase barriers to entry. Accreditation was the main barrier.
7 In this respect, the 
power of commission controlled by lobby group is large because it evaluates the new 
entrants and gives recommendation to the ministry on whether the new entrant fulfils 
the accreditation criteria. Through the control over the criteria the commission could 
restrict the entry.  
 
                                                 
7 Kraft and Vodopoviec (2003) find that opposition of licensing bodies is a main barrier to entry of new 
private business schools in transition countries. This is because bodies include members of the 
established universities who are against increased competition.   14
Research and Education in Economics: A Case Study from the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 
The university system is dominated by state universities in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. In 2004 after 14 years of the beginning of transition there were eight state 
and only two private universities offering programs in economics and business in 
Slovakia. One of the two private Slovak universities AINova is not accredited in spite 
of the fact that its program in economics was praised by the World Bank as the best in 
Slovakia (Pleskovic, Anders, Bader, and Campbell, 2000).  The other private 
university, City University Trencin was functioning on the US accreditation. 
Additionally, there are two major state-run research institutes in economics, i.e. 
Academy of Sciences and Research Institute of Food and Agricultural Economics. In 
the Czech Republic there are 33 faculties offering programs in economics and 
business. Of them 16 are private. However, in 2004 83% of all students in economics 
and business studied at state universities. Moreover, of all students studying at private 
universities 52% studied economics and business in 2004. 
The university system in the two countries is regulated by the Czech Ministry 
of Education and the Slovak Ministry of Education, respectively.  In both countries 
accreditation commissions assist the Ministries of Education. The accreditation 
commissions set evaluation criteria, collect data from universities, and analyze them. 
The Ministry of Education makes the final decision based on the recommendation of 
the accreditation commission. Based on accreditation commission‘s evaluations the 
state also allocates transfers to state universities. Universities (both private and state) 
which do not fulfil the accreditation commission’s criteria lose the accreditation. 
Governments of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic select members 
of the accreditation commission from representatives of universities and research   15
institutes. Universities dominate the accreditation commission. In the current Slovak 
Accreditation Commission of total 21 members there are only 5 from the outside the 
university system. 6 members are from the established research institutes (e.g. Slovak 
Academy of Sciences) and the rest (10) are from state universities. For comparison, 
similar setting has the Czech Accreditation Commission. Total number of members is 
21, of which 13 are from state universities, 4 from established research institutes (e.g. 
Czech Academy of Sciences) and 4 are outsiders. 
  For accreditation of masters and PhD programs the following criteria are 
evaluated in Slovakia:  
−  Research: Universities must prove that they perform internationally or 
nationally recognized continuous research activities. Universities must also 
prove that they actively participate in national or international research 
projects.  
−  Infrastructure: Universities must have satisfactory infrastructure (libraries, 
internet connection, etc.) necessary to perform teaching activities. 
−  Staff: Universities must have sufficient number of teaching staff, proportional 
to number of students and proportional to teaching hours. 
−  State examination commission: Universities must guarantee that in their state 
examination commission there is at least one member from outside the 
university and at least two members with the title of professors or associate 
professor.
8  
                                                 
8 In Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and other Central and East European Countries there are three types 
of academic titles. Assistant professor is the one with PhD degree. Assistant professors lead seminars. 
Associate professor (docent) gives lectures and examines students. To obtain associate professor degree 
the candidate must fulfill certain criteria set by university and evaluated by accreditation commission 
(see table 1 for Slovakia), defend his/her scientific work in front of the scientific committee, and to 
prove his/her teaching ability. Full professor (professor) gives lectures and examines students. Full 
professors must fulfill stricter criteria than associate professor (see table 1 for Slovakia) and again   16
−  Program quality guarantor: The University must have qualified staff with the 
title professor (minimum one) who personally guarantees the program quality. 
The guarantor cannot be older than 65 years. The same professor cannot be 
guarantor of programs at two or more universities. 
In the Czech Republic the Czech Accreditation Commission has similar 
requirements like the Slovak accreditation commission. With respect to lecturers, the 
Czech accreditation commission stipulates that they are required to conduct research 
publishable in journals based outside home universities and/or as monographs.  
From the above it follows that the accreditation criteria on research are 
vaguely defined by the accreditation commission. Decisions of the accreditation 
commission therefore cannot be checked by third party. Monitoring by third party is 
further weakened by the difficulty to measure the quality of research and/or 
education.
9  
Vague criteria and measurement problems enable the accreditation 
commission to restrict the entry of new private universities. Vague criteria evaluating 
research suit the state universities while potential new entrants mostly universities 
from Western Europe and the USA are discriminated against. Western universities 
have comparative advantage in research and clear and transparent criteria for 
evaluating research output as a prerequisite for accreditation would benefit them. On 
the other hand, soft criteria suit established state universities. Established state 
universities benefit from vague criteria for accreditation.  
                                                                                                                                            
defend his/her scientific and pedagogical work in front of the university scientific committee. The title 
professor is awarded by the president of the country.  
9 Niskanen (1994) argues that the measurement problem is one reason why bureaus emerge to provide 
products and services. This is because contracting is difficult and appropriate incentive scheme cannot 
be designed. However, the measurement problem makes it difficult to monitor and instruct the 
bureaucrats possibly leading to low efficiency of bureaucrats. An exogenous improvement in the 
measurement gives the opportunity to reduce the role of bureaucrats relative to markets in the provision 
of products and services.    17
While research criteria are set vaguely, there is a strict and quantitative 
criterion on the number of professors that universities have to have in order to get 
accreditation. Moreover, the professors have to possess degrees (professor or 
associated professor) that are specific to the Czech, Slovak and former Czechoslovak 
university system. The fulfilment of this criterion increases the costs of the foreign 
universities. 
State universities are explicitly subsidized by the state. They are financed from 
the state budget while private universities are not.  Because of subsidies, state 
universities have significant advantage over private universities which are financed 
from students’ tuition fees. Financing of universities discriminates against private 
universities.  
Assuming state universities and private universities provide the same quality 
of education, state universities are able to attract the best students. Private universities 
end up with residual demand, those students that are not accepted to state 
universities
10. If the quality of education is the same at private and state universities 
rational students choose the one which is less costly. All students apply for cheaper 
state universities and private universities can accept only those students who are not 
accepted to state universities. The higher the capacity of state universities the lower is 
the residual demand for private universities. The demand for private universities is 
further reduced by imperfect credit and risk markets. 
Average new entrant to the university market normally has no reputation for 
providing good quality of education; its reputation tend to be lower than the reputation 
of well-established state universities. This fact further reduces residual demand for 
private universities.  
                                                 
10 In 2004 24 695 students applied to state economics universities in the Czech Republic of which 53% 
was accepted. This number indicates how large is the residual market for private universities. 
Regarding private universities, 2 166 students applied in the same year of which 99% was accepted.   18
The fact that private universities satisfy the residual market (low quality 
students) reduces their reputation relative to state universities. This is the well known 
problem of adverse selection.  
In the current system the private universities would have to invest significant 
amount of funds into building a reputation of being a provider of high quality of 
education.  
In summary, given this institutional setting of universities, one may expect low 
research productivity due to low competition (X-inefficiency) and due to distorted 
evaluation criteria (biased toward the interests of the state universities). 
 
Research Productivity in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
The following section provides evidence on research productivity in the field of 
economics at the Czech and Slovak universities and research institutes. The Czech 
data come from Turnovec (2005) and Machacek and Kolcunova (2005) while the 
source of the Slovak data is Ciaian, Pokrivcak, and Rajcaniova (2005). Turnovec 
(2005) collected data on publications of full-time employees of Czech economics 
universities in journals included in the Web of Science and Econlit for the period of 
1994 – 2003. Machacek and Kolcunova (2005) collected data on journal publications 
of Czech docents and professors that obtained the degree in the field of economics in 
the period of 1999- middle of 2005. They also used Web of Science. Ciaian, 
Pokrivcak, and Rajcaniova (2005) present data on publications of full-time employees 
of the Departments of Economics of Slovak universities and Economics research 
institutes for the period of 1990 – 2004 in journals included in Web of Science and 
Econlit.    19
The distribution of journal publications of the Czech and Slovak staff at 
universities and research institutes is similar with the distribution of the CEECs 
(figure 4), which is shown in figures 5 and 6. Figures show that more than 80% of 
research output produced by staff at economic universities and research institutes is 
published in low quality journals. 
Further the Slovak data show that research institutes are more productive than 
universities. Two research institutes of the academy of sciences produce 43 % of all 
research publications, while remaining 44% was produced by 8 universities (21 
faculties). The highest ranked university reached 21% of the level of the academy of 
sciences in production of research publications per capita. The next two in ranking 
reached between around 9 and 15% and the rest reached less than 3% of the Academy 
of Sciences research productivity.  
The total research activity is significantly reduced if publications in domestic 
journals are not taken into account. Of all Slovak journal publications published in 
period between years 1990 and 2003, 86% are published in Slovak peer-reviewed 
journals. Similarly in the Czech Republic 79% percent of all peer-reviewed papers 
published in the period 1993-2004 were published in the Czech journals. This 
indicates that the majority of Czech and Slovak economists are not internationally 
competitive, unable to publish in highly ranked international journals. Also, 
publication in domestic journals is easier because the editorial boards are controlled 
by the representatives of Slovak or Czech research institutes and universities. For 
example, in the case of the journal Ekonomicky Casopis its editorial board consists of 
the members of the University of Economics in Bratislava and Academy of Sciences. 
Staff of these two institutes published around 90% of their total papers in Ekonomicky 
Casopis. Or if taking total papers published by all state universities and research   20
institutes in Ekonomicky Casopis during the whole period 1990-2004, the share of the 
University of Economics in Bratislava and the Academy of Sciences together is 87%. 
The data confirm that, first, the division of labour between academy and 
university still prevails. Universities concentrate on teaching while institutes of the 
academy of sciences specialize in research.  Staff of established state universities has 
lack of skills for research. Second, there are still significant barriers to entry of new 
private universities. Third, universities operate under soft evaluation criteria because 
the criteria are controlled by the state universities through the accreditation 
commission. 
Calculating the overall productivity by degree, figure 7 reveals for Slovakia 
that average number of publications per staff members is less than one (Ciaian, 
Pokrivcak, and Rajcaniova, (2005)). In the case of the Czech Republic the same 
situation holds, average number of publication per staff member is 0.85 (Turnovec, 
2005). There is also high variation in productivity among staff members. Around 80% 
of staff with a PhD degree or higher at Slovak universities do not have a single journal 
publication (figure 8). In the Czech Republic of all docents and professors who got the 
degree in the period 1999- middle of 2005 more than 70% did not have a single 
publication in peer-reviewed journals (Machacek and Kolcunova, 2005).  
 
Conclusions 
After more than ten years of transition most economies of CEEC are significantly 
reformed. Some sectors of the economy remain, however, unreformed.  In particular 
this is the case of university system.  
Total research production and productivity have remained stagnant in CEEC 
and FSU over the transition period.    21
University system is engaged in production of public goods rather than private 
goods. The sector also suffers from quality measurement problem. Because of these 
imperfections an extensive regulation of universities is observed. 
The regulatory body (accreditation commission) sets criteria for evaluation, 
collects information, and assists in policy implementation. The existence of regulatory 
commission, however, affects relative costs and benefits for pressure groups. By 
creating the commission the state decreases the communication cost of pressure 
groups making lobbing activity cheaper.   
Universities representatives are either members of the commission or 
commission cooperates with universities because universities have an information 
advantage. Contacts between the commission and universities becomes 
institutionalized which significantly reduces lobbing costs. 
Moreover, the existence of a regulatory commission through which funds and 
other benefits are delivered to universities is a signal for universities to increase 
activity in order to increase the level of support.  The original intention of policy 
makers to increase efficiency by eliminating market failure is used by pressure groups 
to increase protectionist and redistributive state intervention. The existence of 
regulatory commission sends a signal to market participants that redistributory 
transfers are available. Because of government regulation that increases efficiency it 
is easier for pressure groups to obtain redistributory transfers. In the presence of 
market failure pressure groups are more effective. 
In CEEC the role of history is crucial to understanding the reform path. After 
the fall of communism a lobby group was formed from the representatives of former 
communist educational and research structures.  These group of people were used to 
operate under soft evaluation criteria in the past, during socialism. More importantly   22
they were educated in Marxist economics which was strongly politically biased. Their 
past research was evaluated politically with little emphasis on scientific rigor. 
Because of these reasons the former communist economics elite preferred to maintain 
the status quo characterized by soft evaluation of research output.  
The lobby group installed via the accreditation commission barriers to entry to 
the university market by other subjects and slowed down university reform.  
The evidence from the Czech Republic and Slovakia shows that the 
accreditation commission which is composed from representatives of state universities 
and established research institutes succeeded to maintain their dominant position and 
set evaluation criteria fitting their interests.  This institutional setting led to low 
university research productivity. The organization of research still retains its 
communists features whereby research is almost monopolized by central research 
institutes and universities are engaged mainly in teaching.   23
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Source: United Nations 
Notes: CEECs include Albania, Bulgaria, Czech R., Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. 
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Source: United Nations 
Notes: FSU includes Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan 
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Source: Web of Science database and own calculations 
Notes: 
*For Russia 100 in 1993 
CEEC includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia 
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Source: Web of Science database and own calculations 
Notes: 
A darker colour indicates high impact factor (or higher quality), while white colour 
indicates low impact factor.  
AER – American Economic Review 
*For Russia the data are for the period 1993-2004. 
CEEC includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia 
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Figure 8. Distribution of staff between those with and those without journal 
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Table 1. Requirements for obtaining associate professor (docent) and full 
professor (professor) at selected universities in Slovakia.  
   EU   UMB  SPU    UK 
 doc.  Prof
. 
 doc.  prof.  doc. prof.   doc. prof. 
A. Journal publications*  15  25    35  75    15  28    15  25 
Peer reviewed  1  2    –  –    1  3    –  – 
Foreign –  –    5  10    –  –    2  5 
Domestic –  –    20  45    –  –    –  – 
Other 14  23    10  20    14  25    –  – 
B. Monographs  1  2    1  2    1  2    1  2 
C. Conferences and 
proceedings 
10 20   –  –   12  25    3  5 
Foreign 2  5    –  –    4  10    –  – 
Domestic 8  15    –  –    8  15    –  – 
D. Books  –  –    –  –    –  –    –  – 
Foreign –  –    –  –    –  –    –  – 
Domestic –  –    –  –    –  –    –  – 
Book chapters  –  –   –   –   1  2    –  – 
E. Citations  12  30    30  70    30  50    30** 50***
Foreign 2  5    10  20    –  –   –   – 
Domestic 7  20    20  50    –  –    –  – 
Other 3  5    –  –    –  –    –  – 
F. Lecture notes  3  6    1  3    4  8    –  – 
G. Other publications  7  20    2  5    –  –    – – 
EU- University of Economics, Bratislava 
UMB- Matej Bel University  
SPU- Slovak Agricultural University 
UK- Comenius University 
Notes: 
* For UMB a UK this category includes journals and proceedings. 
** or 10 foreign citations 
*** or 20 foreign citations 